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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. <b>PCMA 54333</b>
TO INFO	Chief of Station, Germany  Chief, WFO  Chief of Base, Berlin		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.  Unknown FTN - 150.3 MFS General
FROM	Chief, Munich Liaison Base		DATE 4 April 1961
SUBJECT	UPHILL/CART/Operations Possible Build-up Material from a New UPHILL CART Case		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)  MARKED FOR INDEXING  NO INDEXING REQUIRED  INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED COS/G: See paragraph 3    EM: See paragraph 4			XX

**REFERENCE**

PCMA 54020, 13 March 1961 32W-5-38/1

1. UPHILL has submitted a third report from the source described in Reference and requests KUBARK evaluate the information with emphasis on the points mentioned in paragraph 4 of Reference.

2. In the past, the source has alluded to a document classified Top Secret which allegedly contains all that is known to the DDR about United States planning in the field of atomic energy through 1965. The latest report which he furnished UPHILL, a copy of which is attached, is supposedly based on this document. The source stated that he had gained access to the document for long enough to produce his report but was unable to obtain the document or copy it. Of interest, the source stated that the document was attributed to "Informants employed in the Department of Technical Information Service Extension of the AEC" (sic).

3. COS/G: Please obtain an evaluation of the attached report for passing to UPHILL.

4. EM: It occurs to us that if the AEC has a technical service department such as described above, this department may well engage in the dissemination of covert material on atomic energy. If this could be checked out, it might shed considerable light on the work of the reports submitted for evaluation.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

**Distribution:**

2-COS/G v/att h/v  
2-EE v/att h/v  
2-BOB v/att h/v

Attachment - UPHILL Report

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

FORM 10-57 53b	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
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4 April 1961

REICH LIAISON DES CONTACTS HOFER

CONFIDENTIAL

4 April 1961 - 1440 to 1610 Hours

1 page

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TOPICS DISCUSSED AND COMMENTS

1. Christian HOFMANN. With reference to the appearance of a Frau HOFMANN, see second, in some of the intercept material on GRUBER, HOFMANN related the following:

a. HOFMANN was very interested in determining whether the Frau HOFMANN mentioned in the intercepts possibly was the wife of a DRV officer by the name of HOFMANN. HOFMANN said the DRV officer was an old friend of FRUBER's and presently was elder of the DRV training school in Cologne. HOFMANN explained that he had not been able to check out background information on HOFMANN for reasons that would become apparent later.

b. In the summer of 1960, Abtelling I of the Berlin police received an anonymous letter from the East stating that a high DRV official by the name of Frau HOFMANN was working for the NSG. The letter went on to say that the DRV official in question had a son by his first marriage and that the son was named Christian and lived in the Soviet Zone. The author of the letter indicated the hope of referring to the West in the near future, at which time he would be happy to provide the full details of his knowledge of HOFMANN's NSG activity. Abtelling I of the Berlin police sent the anonymous letter to the Bundesamt; from there it went to Cologne to the DRV with a request for an effort to be made to identify the DRV official mentioned in the anonymous letter.

c. A short time later the DRV replied that the person in question no doubt was identical with Christian HOFMANN. Then the Bundesamt forwarded a list of questions to the DRV concerning HOFMANN's background and the possibility that he might indeed be working for the NSG. The DRV replied in very vague terms indicating that there was no reason to be suspicious of HOFMANN with the claim that the anonymous letter no doubt was an Eastern provocation designed to defame HOFMANN and possibly had been thought up as a result of an appearance HOFMANN had made on German TV some time earlier.

d. Given August 1960, HOFMANN received copies of the correspondence on HOFMANN from his contacts in Karlsruhe with the request that he take a personal look to see if there might be any derogatory information in FRUBER's files on HOFMANN. HOFMANN said he checked Bartel, learned that FRUBER did indeed have a file; but when he went to get the file, he learned that it already had been checked out by FRUBER. HOFMANN said it was not at all clear why FRUBER had checked out the file, which he had returned at some later date. (COMMENT: In mentioning this, HOFMANN did not say that HOFMANN earlier had been connected with FRUBER and was V-2398.

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However, REINHARDT possibly had forgotten and, as noted below, had not been able to check the file.)

9. REINHARDT said that when the name HOFFMAN came up in the FREEMAN intercepts he had recalled the above, plus the fact that FREEMAN was a close friend of HOFFMAN's, apparently having first met him when both were employed as interrogators at Camp Gleason circa 1930. REINHARDT added that FREEMAN was the godfather of HOFFMAN's youngest son. REINHARDT said he had gone to registry to get HOFFMAN's file in order to review the whole thing and particularly to see if from HOFFMAN's maiden name might be ~~ascertained~~. He was surprised to learn that FREEMAN again had checked out HOFFMAN's file, apparently recently, although FREEMAN had neglected to put down the date he actually had taken the file. REINHARDT said he could think of no possible reason for FREEMAN's needing the file and added that FREEMAN several times had strongly recommended that HOFFMAN be taken on in a staff job with UPHILL, but that his recommendation had been turned down for "various reasons". REINHARDT said he could not alert FREEMAN to the fact that he was interested in the HOFFMAN file and therefore had no alternative but to wait until FREEMAN returned it.

(COMMENT: [ ] called REINHARDT the following day to tell him our files indicated that the ECV HOFFMAN had the same first name as his son in the East, that he was identical with the former EC2538, and that his wife's maiden name was LIBERMAN. REINHARDT said he would be interested in any information we might have in view of his inability to get at UPHILL's information.)

2. ~~UPHILL~~/Pension Division Dresden/Ulla HOFFMAN. REINHARDT noted that there were quite a few conversations between ~~UPHILL~~ and "Ulla" and noted that this was Ulla HOFFMAN, owner of the Pension Dresden. REINHARDT said he had checked and ascertained that FREEMAN on various occasions had strongly recommended that Pension Dresden was an ideal place for UPHILL to house operational types discreetly without having to fear the consequences of official registration. REINHARDT noted that this was interesting, that FREEMAN was a real operator, and that if there was anything ~~going on~~ with ~~UPHILL~~, he obviously might have considerable interest in getting UPHILL to make eye national use of such a Pension.

3. ~~UPHILL~~/Pension Division Dresden/V-2665). REINHARDT also called attention to another phone call between ~~UPHILL~~ and CLEMENS concerning the use of an illegal apartment. REINHARDT said CLEMENS was another close friend of FREEMAN's, worked on the Index Staff in Dienststelle 24, and said that the car being dispatched was an UPHILL radio car used for surveillance. REINHARDT said he was particularly interested in the fact that CLEMENS complained about the high telephone bills he had received for several conversations with FREEMAN. REINHARDT said these presumably were private calls or else there should have been no need to explain about the cost. REINHARDT said he was curious as regards just what FREEMAN and CLEMENS had to talk about and noted that he always had had a few doubts about CLEMENS. REINHARDT went on to say that CLEMENS initially had recommended FREEMAN for employment with UPHILL. REINHARDT also said that in doing some checking on CLEMENS, he had determined that CLEMENS once had lost a "mappe" containing Index material. REINHARDT said this had happened in circa 1937, said he so far had been able to find only a file notation, presumed there had been an official report and investigation, and said that so far he had been unable to locate any such report.

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4. BACER/Kenneth MILLER. [ ] told BERENSON he had recently received a trace request from the LRV Bureau on relation MILLER - the request indicating an LRV investigative interest in determining whether or not SMELZ might still be alive. [ ] gave BERENSON a copy of the trace request dated 15 March 1961 (OCA/LRV/61-300). BERENSON said that, to the best of his knowledge, the LRV had not queried UTILL, and he presumed that he would be able to get a NSL resulting on the extent of the LRV interest and background information by making a trace request to the LRV. [ ] noted that the primary basis for the LRV interest appeared to be information from a London Daily Mail correspondent who had claimed that MILLER was still alive and was working for the Soviets. In this connection, BERENSON again raised the question of the alleged CIC examination of MILLER's body in 1945 and subsequent certification that MILLER really had died. BERENSON said it would be extremely useful if we could possibly find any sort of record on this since he wondered if such an examination actually had taken place. BERENSON said he realized it might be very difficult to locate any record of this event and realized also that it was possible that even if it had happened, no record had been made. Also on the subject of MILLER, BERENSON said he recently had arranged through a friend of his that an official announcement be made that MILLER was legally dead as far as the German government was concerned. BERENSON said that a statement to this effect had recently been put out as a result of his efforts and that he had taken this step in order to help cover up the fact that UTILL was intensely interested in MILLER and assumed that he really was alive.

5. UTILITY/Admiral CANARIS/Martin BORMANN. Apropos some general comments about BACER, the Note Bayle, etc. - BERENSON said that at one point during the war, UTILITY had had a meeting with CANARIS to discuss the lack of strategic information to the Soviets via Note Bayle channels. BERENSON said UTILITY and CANARIS had been interested in trying to pin down the most probable ultimate source of the information that was known to be reaching the Soviets. BERENSON said UTILITY and CANARIS had been in complete agreement that the Soviet source almost certainly was Martin BORMANN.

6. SMELZ. [ ] asked BERENSON if SMELZ had passed along Wade's comments on the subject of RUFF. BERENSON said WADSWORTH had not. [ ] then outlined part of the [ ] information, using only the points that RUFF was known to have lived in Frankfurt until circa 1956, that RUFF during his CIC days was very interested in obtaining a job with the RLV, and that RUFF once had told a RUBIN that he was in contact with BERENSON - the last contact mentioned to us being in December 1954. [ ] further stated that [ ] was convinced that the possibility [ ] had RUFF in mind was worth looking into, although we locally felt the information provided by [ ] was too vague to be very helpful. BERENSON seemed rather bemused that anyone seriously would consider RUFF as being capable of serving as an Eastern penetration agent of UTILL. BERENSON's reaction reported per RUBIN-2405. In discussing the possibility that there might be something wrong with RUFF, BERENSON said that the only security factor in RUFF's file, to the best of his knowledge, was the fact that Bannalore SCHWARTZ, one of BERENSON's sources, admitted in the course of interviewing her KGB activities that she had received a telephone tap request from the brother of RUFF who resides in Israel. BERENSON said it was some time after RUFF ever had had contact with BERENSON and said he would look into the matter.

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7. UPHILL's "Pull Method" Team. BERGMAN mentioned the "team" created to handle the investigation of the [ ] information and went into somewhat more detail than UPHILL had earlier via memo. BERGMAN mentioned GRANDIN would be looking into the possible ties between Bole Bogalle and [ ] information. BERGMAN also said that PTL. GRUND would be occupied primarily in assisting PLANT and in plotting through files in the Headquarters' building to pull together the voluminous material that must be checked - especially in trying to get a feeling on [ ] GRUND information. BERGMAN said that PTL. GRUND in his office would take care of all of the necessary typing and also would be used extensively to run traces and pull documents in files, which she could do less efficiently than could either BERGMAN or PLANT.

8. BERGMAN's Thinking on Investigation. BERGMAN said he was going to do everything possible to cover as much ground as he could before his trip to the States via PTL. KUNZ. He said the amount of material still to be pulled from UPHILL's files was formidable, particularly in trying to run down the BLACK matter. BERGMAN said he also was in the process of trying to sort out those things that would not seem to directly affect UPHILL staff security, simply to put the real problems in better perspective and to enable UPHILL to devote the primary effort on two most important matters. BERGMAN said he was thinking of such peripheral cases as the EDLA affair and reported that he was more concerned than ever that there was no penetration of UPHILL involved and that Pam EDLA had provided the US with reports to which she was known to have access, plus information she had elicited from JUSTIS, who definitely had been an working source for Pam EDLA. BERGMAN said that he felt that the EDLA case was in the same category. BERGMAN said he also was in the process on these and several other cases of putting the available information in such shape so as to be able to sound out the possibility of taking executive action. BERGMAN said it would not be clear to him until he had taken a closer look just what the chances would be for taking executive action, but he hoped to sound out some of his contacts in Barbaro in the near future without, of course, giving them enough facts to identify the cases he was talking about.

9. UPHILL's One Accounting. BERGMAN explained that UPHILL recently had taken BERGMAN to a source on UPHILL to the Soviet State Circus performances. BERGMAN said UPHILL had picked up the tab and had told BERGMAN's source that he was going to state reimbursement for the grounds that the visit had been for operational reasons. BERGMAN said he was doing some checking and had discovered other instances where UPHILL obviously was padding and falsifying his operational accountings. BERGMAN said with a grin that if all else failed, he was quite sure he could get rid of UPHILL in due time on this single alone.

10. Surveillance of UPHILL. BERGMAN said he had determined that the way he had in mind to try to cover UPHILL's Overseas' home on weekends could not really accomplish anything useful by himself. BERGMAN had interpreted an earlier Goldstone remark that he might be able to help out to mean that he actually planned to try to surveil UPHILL at his country home over the Easter weekend. [ ] said nothing had been done and that it probably would be possible for us to assist, although it would be difficult because we would not consider covering UPHILL by using anything other than our own staff officers. BERGMAN said he would be very happy if UPHILL could place surveillance on UPHILL even weekend when it was known he would be in Overseas', and [ ] said he would check into the possibility.

11. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ and that he had been doing some further checking on ~~SECRET~~ and was reportedly coming to the conclusion that ~~SECRET~~ could be dropped from the list of prime suspects. In this connection, ~~SECRET~~ noted that nothing of interest was coming out of the telephone coverage on ~~SECRET~~ and said he probably would request in the near future that to stop the coverage on ~~SECRET~~. (Comment: This would seem to indicate that whatever ~~SECRET~~ put ~~SECRET~~ to high on the list of the effort had subsequently been classified to ~~SECRET~~'s satisfaction.)

12. ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~. This was discussed briefly and when ~~SECRET~~ seemed to be at the impression that the trip was fine for 19 April, ~~SECRET~~ said ~~SECRET~~'s last word from ~~SECRET~~ was that it was probable that the trip might have to be postponed because of budget considerations. ~~SECRET~~ said this was more to tell and that he hoped very much no postponement would be necessary. (Comment: ~~SECRET~~ said ~~SECRET~~ the same day that the trip was on for 19 April.)

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- 1 - ~~SECRET~~
- 1 - ~~SECRET~~
- 1 - C/LS
- 1 - File

Declassified and Approved for Release 6 April 1961